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I. INTRODUCTION
April 18, 1861 was a fateful day in American history. On that day,
a talented fifty-four year old army officer was offered the command of
the Union Army.1 But on the same day, he learned that his home state of
Virginia had decided to secede from the Union.2 Although a Southerner,
he was not enthusiastic about the institution of slavery.3 He opposed
secession, saying that the Framers would never have “exhausted so
much labor, wisdom, and forbearance” in forming the Union “if it was
intended to be broken up by every member of the [Union] at will.”4 Yet,
in the end, he decided that his primary allegiance was to his State,
∗ Sho Sato Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley.
1. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 280-81 (1988).
2. Id. at 281.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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proclaiming “I cannot raise my hand against my birthplace, my home,
my children.”5 Five days later, the officer—one Robert E. Lee—became
the Commander in Chief of the Virginia military, and within a month he
was a Confederate general.6 If he had accepted the offer to head the
Union Army, the course of the Civil War might have been far different.
Robert E. Lee’s decision exemplified the choice facing Southerners
at the start of the Civil War: was their primary allegiance to their home
states or to the United States of America? According to the foremost
historical study of the constitutional evolution of citizenship, “the Civil
War was a struggle over the nature of the community created in 1789—a
bloody contest over allegiance.”7 Thus, “[t]he lines now were sharply
drawn between those who stressed the primacy of the state communities
of allegiance and those who insisted that the Union had created one
nation and one people.”8 After the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, the status of Americans “with respect to the
states depended upon this national statute and upon their own choice or
residence, and it could not be impeached or violated by state action.”9 In
short, the Civil War itself and the ensuing Fourteenth Amendment
resolved the previously contested issue of the relative priority of state
and national allegiance.10
A corollary flows naturally from this observation. Any remaining
constitutional question about rights of states to secede was laid to rest: if
allegiance to the national government was primary, action by states
could not cut the bond between Americans and the national government.
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment is explicit. First, anyone born or
naturalized within the jurisdiction of the United States is a citizen of the
5. Id.
6. Id. at 280-81.
7. JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 340
(1978). The Development of American Citizenship remains the leading historical treatment of the
subject. DOUGLAS BRADBURN, THE CITIZENSHIP REVOLUTION: POLITICS AND THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN UNION, 1774-1804 (2009), adds a valuable perspective on the development of
nationalism during the early years of the Republic.
8. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 340.
9. Id. at 343.
10. See ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN SLAVERY 93
(2010) (“Until after the Civil War, there existed no commonly agreed understanding of citizenship
or of the rights it entailed.”). Of course, this is not to say states have lost all significance to
Americans. As Bruce Ackerman says:
No need to exaggerate. I don’t suggest that Americans think of themselves as citizens of
a unitary nation-state on the model of, say, nineteenth-century France. We remain
Pennsylvanians or Oregonians as well as Americans, but the textual promise of the
Fourteenth Amendment has finally become a living reality: we are Americans first.
Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1749-50 (2007).
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United States and of the state in which he or she resides.11 State
citizenship is derivative and cannot be controlled by the state itself.
Second, no state can deprive any American citizen of the privileges or
immunities of citizenship—which means, for example, that the state
cannot deprive a citizen of U.S. citizenship by seceding.12 The
Privileges or Immunities Clause explicitly prohibits a state from
depriving citizens of their federal rights, and secession would be a
blatant violation of that prohibition.
The implications of the Citizenship Clause and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause for secession should be obvious to anyone who
understands how sovereignty, citizenship, and the right to national
protection were interwoven in antebellum thought. But even among
constitutional scholars, such knowledge is not universal, and the law
review literature does not directly address this point.
The broader significance of the Fourteenth Amendment for the
nature of the Union—and specifically, for the issue of secession—has
been insufficiently appreciated by constitutional scholars. For instance,
one leading constitutional scholar has pointed to the secession issue as a
key example of the irrelevance of constitutional text:
Before the Civil War, there was a lively and inconclusive debate over
whether the Constitution permitted states to secede. There is no longer

11. “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. This language derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), with a
change from excepting persons “subject to any foreign power” and “Indians not taxed” with “not
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Many supporters of the statute believed that the
Thirteenth Amendment made blacks citizens when it abolished slavery. See Robert J. Kaczorowski,
Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
863, 899 n.157 (1986) (citing United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1867) as
exemplifying this view). For example, Senator Benjamin Wade said:
I have always believed that every person, of whatever race or color, who was born within
the United States was a citizen of the United States; but by the decisions of the courts
there has been a doubt thrown over that subject; and if the Government should fall into
the hands of those who are opposed to the views that some of us maintain, those who
have been accustomed to take a different view of it, they may construe the provision in
such a way as we do not think it liable to construction at the time, unless we fortify and
make it very strong and clear.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th CONG., 1ST SESS. 2768 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Wade). The Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment shared this view but wished to eliminate any remaining doubt on the
question. See Richard L. Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment and
What They Tell Us About Its Interpretation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 289, 295-97 (2006). For a review of
the legislative history, see Garett Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A “Legislative History,” 60 AM. U.
L. REV. 331 (2010).
12. “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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any such debate; the issue was settled by the Civil War. No one today
would seriously advance the position that the Constitution permits
secession, at least the kind that the Confederacy attempted. Where is
the text that settled this question? The answer, of course, is that this
question, like other important constitutional questions, is decided by
something other than the text.13

It is true, of course, that the Civil War resolved the issue and
crystallized a new conception of the nature of the Union. It is wrong,
however, to see the resolution as completely non-textual. In fact, the
Fourteenth Amendment enshrines the Civil War’s political
transformation of the Union into Constitutional text.
In part, the victory of nationalism was embodied in the Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Seth Kreimer gives a cogent
explanation of this point:
At the time the United States was founded, one could conceive of
American citizenship as derived from a more basic identification with
each of the component states, but the time has long past when the
“United States of America” was a plural construction. . . . As a
political matter the Civil War resolved the issue by force of arms, and
the resolution was embodied in the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment: persons born or naturalized in the United
States are indissolubly citizens of the United States, and only
derivatively or contingently citizens of the “State wherein they
reside.”14

Similarly, a federal judge remarked in 1871 that “[b]y the original
constitution citizenship in the United States was a consequence of
13. David A. Strauss, The New Textualism in Constitutional Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1153, 1155-56 (1998). Strauss has made the same argument elsewhere:
In the decades leading up to the Civil War, respected political and legal figures advanced
serious legal arguments, claiming descent from Jefferson's Kentucky Resolutions, in
support of the right to secede. No amendment adopted after the Civil War settled this
question, either expressly or by any reasonably direct implication.
Yet the question has, without doubt, been settled. The person on the street would
say that the Civil War settled it, and that person would be right. The Civil War settled it,
even though no formal amendment was added to the Constitution.
David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1486
(2001) (emphasis added). Strauss is probably right that as a practical matter, the Civil War would
have banished any serious claims about the right to secede even without a formal Amendment. The
Fourteenth Amendment can be seen as memorializing a constitutional shift that had already taken
place, at least as much as it can be considered to be the cause of the shift. But as a legal matter, the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the newly entrenched vision of the Constitution and gave it a
textual home.
14. Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand; the Importance of Borders in American Federalism,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 983 (2002).
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citizenship in a state,” but that under the Fourteenth Amendment “this
order of things is reversed.”15 Thus, the Citizenship Clause implies that
a state has no right to sever the bond between a U.S. citizen and that
national government through secession or otherwise.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not, however, leave the issue of
state power to implication. Although the Citizenship Clause is part of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s resolution of the issue of secession, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause is equally important. While the
Citizenship Clause makes it clear that citizens owe their primary
allegiance to the federal government, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause makes it clear that states have no power to interfere with the
rights attaching to citizenship. Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment
then completes the picture, giving Congress the power to enforce the
rights of citizenship against the states. In short, the Fourteenth
Amendment creates a duty on citizens of allegiance toward the United
States, a prohibition on state interference with those rights, and a federal
power of enforcement against the states.
One reason why the Fourteenth Amendment’s invalidation of
secession is important is that there has been something of a revival of
interest in the topic in recent years. Most notably, in April 2009, Texas
Governor Rick Perry came close to threatening secession, reportedly
suggesting that “Texans might at some point get so fed up they would
want to secede from the union,” though he said “he sees no reason why
Texas should do that.”16 He added:
There’s a lot of different scenarios. . . . We’ve got a great union.
There’s absolutely no reason to dissolve it. But if Washington
continues to thumb their nose at the American people, you know, who
knows what might come out of that. But Texas is a very unique place,
and we’re a pretty independent lot to boot.17

At the other end of the political spectrum, Thomas Naylor, a retired
economics professor, published a book in 2005 advocating that Vermont
withdraw from the Union.18 Academic discussion of the secession issue

15. United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 82 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15282).
16. Governor Says Texans May Want to Secede From Union But Probably Won’t,
FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 15, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/04/15/governor-says-texanswant-secede-union-probably-wont/.
17. Id.
18. THOMAS H. NAYLOR, THE VERMONT MANIFESTO: THE SECOND VERMONT REPUBLIC
(2005); Robert C. Black, Book Note, If at First You Don’t Secede, Try, Try Again, 39 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 839, 842 (2005) (reviewing NAYLOR, supra). See also Joseph Curl, Blue States Buzz Over

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 6

12- FARBER_MACRO.DOCM

484

6/13/2012 3:42 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[45:479

has also increased,19 as is indicated by this Symposium itself. Although
occasional uses of secessionist rhetoric should probably not be taken as
serious advocacy for fragmenting the nation, they do highlight the need
to clarify the nature of our constitutional order.
To understand fully the relevance of the first two clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to secession, we need to examine the antebellum
disputes about citizenship and sovereignty, the subject of Part II below.
Issues about citizenship arose in the context of specific disputes about
naturalization, expatriation, and the rights of freedmen, but they
implicated conflicts over the seat of allegiance and the nature of the
Union.
Part III turns to the Reconstruction debates and shows how they
reflect a fundamentally nationalistic view of citizenship.
The
Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution were connected with a
powerful vision of national citizenship and its implications for federal
and state power. Under this vision, the national government had the first
claim to the loyalty of citizens and in return was obligated to protect
their rights as American citizens against state interference. An effort by
a state to secede would directly imperil the status of its residents as
American citizens, and both the federal government and the residents
themselves had a duty to resist this interference with their constitutional
rights. The two clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment dealing most
directly with citizenship embody this vision.
II. ANTEBELLUM CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND THE NATURE OF
THE UNION
It might seem obvious today that state law cannot control who is or
is not a U.S. citizen. But it was not always so clear, for reasons that
were related to the ultimate crisis of the constitutional order during the
Civil War. Understanding the connection between citizenship and
secession requires an examination of the conflicting theories of the

Secession, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at A1 (describing blue state buzz over secession after
George W. Bush’s successful re-election, some of it serious, some of it merely rhetorical).
19. See, e.g., Cynthia Nicoletti, The American Civil War as a Trial by Battle, 28 LAW & HIST.
REV. 71 (2010) (arguing that the Civil War did not resolve the legal question of the secession’s
constitutionality); Peter Radan, Lincoln, the Constitution and Secession, in SECESSION AS AN
INTERNATIONAL PHENOMENON: FROM AMERICA’S CIVIL WAR TO CONTEMPORARY SEPARATIST
MOVEMENTS 56-75 (Don H. Doyle ed., 2010) (critiquing Lincoln’s arguments against secession);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 691,
703-15 (2004) (endorsing Lincoln’s view of secession); Akhil Reed Amar, Abraham Lincoln and
the American Union, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1109 (2001) (critical discussion of Lincoln’s view).
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Union that led to the secession crisis and their connection with
antebellum conceptions of citizenship. Part A will briefly describe
antebellum constitutional theories, Part B investigates conceptions of
citizenship, and Part C ties the two topics together.
A.

Secession and the Nature of the Union

Today, the Supreme Court’s view of the nature of the Union holds
that the Constitution transformed a loose association of states into a true
national government that derived its power directly from the people.
This view was expressed by the majority opinion in the Term Limits
case, in which Justice Stevens’ majority opinion lays out the
conventional modern view of state and federal sovereignty.20 Under the
Articles of Confederation, according to Justice Stevens, “the States
retained most of their sovereignty, like independent nations bound
together only by treaties.”21 The new Constitution “reject[ed] the notion
that the Nation was a collection of States, and instead creat[ed] a direct
link between the National Government and the people of the United
States.”22 Under this view, secession by a state would have been
appropriate before the ratification of the Constitution as a form of treaty
revocation, but after the Constitution the states became subordinate
sovereigns who had no right to interfere with the relationship between
the federal government and We the People.
Before the Civil War, there were a variety of views on this issue.
Abraham Lincoln was at the nationalist end of the spectrum, and his
view went further than the Term Limits majority in affirming American
nationhood. In Lincoln’s view, the “Union is much older than the
Constitution.”23 Instead of viewing the Articles of Confederation as a
federation between independent state sovereigns, he argued that the
Union actually pre-dated the formation of the states themselves.24 From
this perspective, the Constitution was simply another step in the
evolution of the nation’s government, merely being a revised framework
to govern an already existing nation.
In effect, Lincoln’s vision of nationalism made the Declaration of
Independence, rather than the Constitution, the foundational national
20.
21.
22.
23.

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
Id. at 803.
Id.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, First Inaugural Address, in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 265 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS].
24. For a defense of Lincoln’s view, see Murray Dry, Born on the Fourth of July, LEGAL
AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2005, at 66.
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document. Thus, Lincoln displaced the Constitution from center stage,
tying national identity much more closely to the Declaration as the initial
collective statement of American nationhood. This may or may not be
good history, but it surely accords with conventional Fourth of July
rhetoric, which ties the Declaration not merely to the independence of
individual states from Britain but more importantly to the creation of the
United States.
Indeed, Lincoln insisted that that the Union was formed by the
Articles of Association in 1774, even before it was “matured and
continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776.”25 Because the
states never had any independent existence, secession was legally
impossible. As Lincoln said, “[t]he States have their status IN the
Union, and they have no other legal status. If they break from this, they
can only do so against law, and by revolution.”26
Lincoln made this constitutional vision the centerpiece of his
opposition to secession. After the fall of Fort Sumter, Lincoln’s
message to Congress traced the Union back to 1774 and then to the
Declaration of Independence: “Our States have neither more, nor less
power, than that reserved to them, in the Union by the Constitution—no
one of them ever having been a State out of the Union. The original
ones passed in the Union even before they cast off their British colonial
dependence.”27
Thus, according to Lincoln, in the Declaration of Independence,
[T]he ‘United Colonies’ were declared to be ‘Free and Independent
States’; but, even then, the object plainly was not to declare their
independence of one another, or of the Union; but directly the
contrary, as their mutual pledge, and their mutual action, before, at the
time, and afterwards, abundantly show.28

A few years after Independence, Lincoln said, the Union was
strengthened by the Articles of Confederation, which were declared to
be perpetual, and then by the Constitution, which sought a “more perfect
union.”29 From this he deduced that secession was unconstitutional:
“But if the destruction of the Union, by one, or by a part only, of the

25. LINCOLN, supra note 23, at 265.
26. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Special Message to Congress, July 4, 1861, in 4 COLLECTED
WORKS, supra note 23, at 434.
27. Id. at 433.
28. Id.
29. LINCOLN, supra note 23, at 265.
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States, be lawfully possible, the Union is less perfect than before the
Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity.”30
If the Confederation was perpetual, and the Constitution created a
more perfect union, then the Constitution had to provide for a perpetual
bond. Moreover, because the only true sovereign government was
national, Lincoln’s view implied that citizenship was predominantly a
national rather than state status; thus, allegiance was primarily owed to
the federal government.
Lincoln’s nationalist view contrasted sharply with the statecentered constitutional theory held by many Southerners. In defending
the constitutionality of secession, Jefferson Davis affirmed a longstanding Southern view of the nature of the Union. During the
American Revolution, Davis said, the British threat to American liberty
had led to an alliance under which each state expressly retained its
sovereignty.31
Davis’ narrative continued with a Constitutional
Convention by state-appointed delegates who negotiated what he called
“a compact between independent States.”32 State sovereignty, Davis
said, was then explicitly reaffirmed in the Tenth Amendment.33 But a
heresy arose in the North, according to Davis—a heresy holding that that
Constitution did not create a compact of states but a national
government. 34
Note that Lincoln did not exactly endorse this “heresy”—instead,
he viewed nationhood as pre-dating the Constitution. So, by Davis’
standards, Lincoln’s view was even worse than the northern “heresy;” it
was practically infidel. It is little wonder that Lincoln failed to persuade
Southerners of his views.
The theory advanced by Davis was hardly original. John Calhoun
was perhaps the most articulate spokesman for the Southern theory of
the Union. He claimed that the states had separately become sovereign
when they declared independence from England.35 This sovereignty
remained intact through the Articles of Confederation, and in the
Constitution, all the states had done was appoint the federal government

30. Id.
31. Jefferson Davis, Message to Congress April 29, 1861 (Ratification of The Constitution),
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_m042961.asp.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. JOHN C. CALHOUN, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States,
in UNION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 84 (Ross M. Lence
ed., 1992).
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as their agent to perform certain functions.36 According to Calhoun, the
“government is a federal, in contradistinction to a national
government—a government formed by the States; ordained and
established by the States, and for the States—without any participation
or agency whatever, on the part of the people, regarded in the aggregate
as forming a nation.”37 (Notice the language “By the states . . . and for
the states,” and contrast that language with Lincoln at Gettysburg.)
There is, Calhoun said, “no such community, politically speaking, as the
people of the United States, regarded in the light of, and as constituting
one people or nation.”38 In short, he said, the Constitution created “the
government of a community of States, and not the government of a
single State or nation.”39 In a community of states, clearly the allegiance
of citizens runs directly to their own state and only derivatively to the
community as a whole.
Calhoun and Davis were important historical figures, but they did
not evolve their theories on their own. Both drew on a larger tradition of
Southern constitutionalism going back to Thomas Jefferson. Well
before Calhoun, the Southern vision of the Union had begun to emerge
in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.40 The Kentucky Resolutions,
based on a draft of Jefferson’s, began with a strong affirmation of the
compact theory. The states created the general government for special
purposes, reserving to each state all remaining power. The Resolutions
maintained that the federal government, as a creature of the compact,
was not final judge of the extent of its own powers. Instead, each party
to the contract had to judge for itself whether the terms of the agreement
had been violated.41 The Resolutions did not speak of secession, but the
logical implication was that a party to the compact could withdraw in
case of a breach or repudiation of the agreement by other parties.
Thus, by the onset of the Civil War, the South already had an antinationalist, state-centered theory of the Constitution for over half a
century. Indeed, according to a recent history of secession, the states’

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 83-84.
Id. at 116.
Id.
Id. at 82.
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at 719 (1993).
41. Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS 540, 544 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891). On the difference between Jefferson and
Madison regarding the precise nature of the federal compact, see H. Jefferson Powell, The
Principles of ’98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689, 717-18 (1994).
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rights theory had become so familiar to Southerners by 1860 as to be
boring:
Secessionists’ potentially saving state’s rights creed started as a
legalistic bore. The 1860 secessionists (and their fathers and
grandfathers) had grown up listening to endless disquisitions on how
the states came before the nation, on how the states had ratified the
U.S. Constitution, on how the ratifying bodies retained reserved rights
and especially the right to withdraw their ratification, and how the
original parties to a contract can rescind the document if its terms were
violated.42

So familiar was this theory that Southerners were outraged “when
federal agents coercively violated the (white) people of a state’s
sovereign right to shift consent to another government.”43 This theory
became invaluable in bringing the Upper South to secede after Fort
Sumter. States like Virginia had not found Lincoln’s election a
sufficient basis to secede, but “[i]f the federal agency coerced the people
of a single state who had claimed their state’s right to remove their
consent and never to be enslaved, the state’s rights justification could
bring other southern states charging to the rescue, whatever they thought
of the expediency of the first secession.”44
Even today, remnants of the antebellum Southern constitutional
vision occasionally surface. Speaking for four members of the Court
fifteen years ago, Justice Thomas invoked a similar conception of
federalism. In his Term Limits dissent, he said that the “ultimate source
of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each
individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the
Nation as a whole”—adding that “the people of the several States are the
only true source of power.”45 He seemed to indicate state sovereignty
remains primary today: “the people of each State retained their separate
political identities,”46 and the “very name ‘congress’ suggests a coming
together of representatives from distinct entities.”47
Thus, although so far as we know no current Justice endorses a
right to secede, elements of the antebellum Southern view linger in some
present-day quarters. One implication of this article is that the
42. WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS TRIUMPHANT, 1854-1861,
at 346 (2007).
43. Id. at 349.
44. Id. at 351.
45. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846-47 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 849.
47. Id. at 857-58.
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Fourteenth Amendment completed the work of the Constitution itself in
consolidating the original colonies into a true nation. Thus, the Term
Limits dissenters were embracing a theory that lost whatever validity it
ever had by 1867.
B.

Federalism and Citizenship in the Antebellum Period

Justice Thomas oversimplified the issue in his Term Limits dissent,
but the historical record does reflect considerable uncertainty and
dispute about whether the United States was truly a nation. The question
of “whether the Revolution had created one community of allegiance or
many” remained unresolved.48
As an important part of this larger confusion, the relationship
between states and national citizenship was unclear before the Civil
War. Just three weeks after the Declaration of Independence, the
Continental Congress passed a resolution providing that “all persons
residing within any of the United Colonies, and deriving protection from
the laws of the same, owe allegiance to the said laws, and are members
of such colony.”49 The states quickly adopted their own naturalization
laws,50 but their power over citizenship was the source of confusion.
One reason for the confusion was that citizenship in a single state
had significance in other states. Each state’s citizens became entitled to
equal treatment in all other states under the Articles of Confederation’s
precursor to what is now the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV.51 As Kettner says, “[a]lthough the primary locus of allegiance
throughout the Confederation period was still in the individual sovereign
state, the idea that citizens belonged to a larger national community
surfaced frequently, never fully articulated or theoretically explored, but
persuasive—almost instinctive—in certain contexts.”52 For instance, it
was unclear whether a person who had been naturalized by a state under
the Articles was thereby a citizen of the United States for purposes of
qualifying to sit in the United States Senate.53
Before the Civil War, the dispute over sovereignty was tied to a
dispute over the meaning of citizenship. During the nullification crisis,

48. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 209.
49. Id. at 179.
50. Id. at 214-19.
51. Id. at 220.
52. Id. at 224.
53. Id. at 234-35. For an overview of immigration policy prior to the Constitution, see James
E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the Early Republic:
Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 359, 371-85 (2010).
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South Carolina insisted that the: “[A]llegiance of the citizens . . . is due
to the . . . State, and . . . obedience only, and not allegiance, is due . . . to
any other power or authority, to whom a control over them has been or
may be delegated by the state.”54 The state legislature then passed a law
requiring all militia officers to swear that they had “faithful and true
allegiance” to the state.55 The law was held unconstitutional by the state
appellate court, with a dissenting nullifier arguing that only the state
government could command a citizen’s ultimate allegiance.56
Southerners also argued that a national statute governing
expatriation (abandonment of citizenship) would be unconstitutional,
because it was not within any express Congressional power, leaving the
matter to the states.57 As a U.S. Representative from Virginia put it,
“[t]he relation to the State government was the basis of the relation to
the General Government, and therefore, as long as man continues a
citizen of a State, he must be considered a citizen of the United States.”58
On the eve of Civil War, the dominant Southern view was that
allegiance to state government was primary. However, adherence to the
primacy of state citizenship was not absolute. In the name of protecting
the power of Southern states to exclude free blacks from other states,
Southerners were also willing to limit the power of other states to make
blacks citizens for purposes of federal law. Allowing Northern states to
make blacks into citizens would have led to the unpalatable conclusion
that their status as citizens in Northern states would have been entitled to
recognition in Southern states under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott contended that the
Framers considered blacks “a subordinate and inferior class of beings,
who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether
54. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 265.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 267.
57. Id. at 282-83. Justice Paterson had taken a contrary view in the lead opinion in Talbot v.
Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795):
The act of the legislature of Virginia, does not apply. Ballard was a citizen of Virginia,
and also of the United States. If the legislature of Virginia pass an act specifying the
causes of expatriation, and prescribing the manner in which it is to be effected by the
citizens of that state, what can be its operation on the citizens of the United States? If the
act of Virginia affects Ballard’s citizenship, so far as respects that state, can it touch his
citizenship so far as it regards the United States? Allegiance to a particular state, is one
thing; allegiance to the United States is another. Will it be said, that the renunciation of
allegiance to the former implies or draws after it a renunciation of allegiance to the
latter? The sovereignties are different; the allegiance is different; the right too, may be
different.
Id. at 153-54. For background on the case, see BRADBURN, supra note 7, at 116-22.
58. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 283.
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emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no
rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the
Government might choose to grant them.”59 Justice Daniels managed to
exceed even Taney’s level of offensiveness with his dictum: “That in
the establishment of the several communities now the States of this
Union, and in the formation of the Federal Government, the African was
not deemed politically a person.”60 Note, however, that the Constitution
refers to slaves as “persons held to servitude,”61 as Justice McLean
pointed out in his dissent.62 It is also significant that citizenship had
never been completely limited to whites: Indians were eligible for
citizenship, and some southern courts held that free blacks automatically
became state citizens.63
James Madison himself took the view that emancipated blacks were
entitled to the right of citizenship.64 Moreover, an 1803 federal statute
banned ships from bringing any black into the country who were not “a
native, a citizen, or registered seaman of the United States.”65 That
statute clearly implies that a black could be a citizen of the United
States, and in 1807, Americans had been outraged by British seizure of
four “American citizens,” two of whom were black.66

59. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-05 (1856). DON EDWARD FEHRENBACHER, THE
DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978), is a classic
treatment of the historical context, legal complexities, decisional process, and impact of the case. It
is more readily available in an abridged paperback, DON EDWARD FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW,
& POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1981). Another useful
treatment is PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS
(1997), which also contains excerpts from the long, meandering opinions and reprints the responses
of Northern and Southern papers to the decision. For a brief introduction to the case and its effects,
see RICHARD H. SEWELL, A HOUSE DIVIDED: SECTIONALISM AND CIVIL WAR, 1848-1865, at 57-61
(1988).
60. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 481.
61. The fugitive slave clause provides:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from
such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such
Service of Labour may be due.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. The point is that, while slaves may have been property, they were
also persons for some constitutional purposes. Whether status as property could be squared with the
right to due process created by the Fifth Amendment is a question that may have had no satisfactory
resolution before the issue was rendered moot by the Civil War.
62. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 537 (Mclean, J., dissenting).
63. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 316-19.
64. BRADBURN, supra note 7, at 259.
65. Dred Scott, 60. U.S. at 587 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
66. BRADBURN, supra note 7, at 235-36.
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In dissent, Justice McLean pointed out that Taney’s historical
exegesis was remarkably one-sided: “[W]hile I admit the government
was not made expecially [sic] for the colored race, yet many of them
were citizens of the New England States, and exercised the rights of
suffrage when the Constitution was adopted.”67 In Massachusetts, for
example, a proposed 1778 state constitution went down to defeat in part
because it excluded blacks from the right to vote.68 This may not prove
that free blacks were regarded as U.S. citizens, but it does rebut Taney’s
assertion that blacks were incapable of being members of the political
community or of having legal rights that others were required to
accept.69
One reason for the relative paucity of evidence about the Framers’
definition of citizenship is that they were rarely required to consider it.
Citizenship is an important legal concept, but not necessarily decisive in
a broad range of contexts. In many respects, personhood is the more
important concept under the U.S. Constitution. In the Constitution itself,
citizenship is mostly mentioned as a job qualification for elected federal
office.70 But there is no constitutional requirement of citizenship for
appointed office as a member of the judiciary or the Cabinet; nor any
limitation of the franchise to citizens.
Moreover, the Constitution allowed free blacks to participate in the
selection of members of Congress, provided that the state allowed them
to vote or hold office. Article I, section 2, provides that voters for House
members “have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature,” so blacks could vote in
federal elections if they could vote in state elections, regardless of

67. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 537.
68. BRADBURN, supra note 7, at 245. Bradburn believes that free blacks were close to
treatment as citizens at the time of the Revolution but then were gradually demoted to the status of
“denizens” in the early Nineteenth Century. Id. at 239-40.
69. The Dred Scott case continues to attract interest today, as seen by recent scholarship such
as Gerald Leonard, Law and Politics Reconsidered: A New Constitutional History of Dred Scott, 34
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 747 (2009); Harry V. Jaffa, Dred Scott Revisited, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 197 (2008); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 49 (2007); Sarah H. Cleveland, Foreign Authority, American Exceptionalism,
and the Dred Scott Case, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 393 (2007); Sam Erman, An “Unintended
Consequence”: Dred Scott Reinterpreted, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1157 (2008).
70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (members of the House must have been citizens of the
United States for seven years); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (Senators must have been citizens of the
United States for nine years and citizens of the state at the time of election); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1,
cl. 5 (the President must be “a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of
the Adoption of this Constitution”). Note that the requirements for Senators clearly distinguish
between United States citizenship and citizenship in a particular state.
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whether they were citizens.71 Under Article I, section 3, members of the
Senate are chosen by state legislatures, with no stated restriction on who
can serve in such a legislature. 72
Apart from the qualifications for political office, there were only a
few provisions directly bearing on citizenship. Article I, section 8,
clause 4, gives Congress the power to “establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization . . . throughout the United States.”73 Otherwise,
citizenship shows up only in Article III’s definition of diversity
jurisdiction74 and in Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.75
Only in these two clauses and in the requirements for election to the
Senate is state citizenship rather than federal citizenship mentioned.
And notwithstanding Taney’s effort to restrict Article III diversity
jurisdiction to whites, there was no constitutional barrier to blacks
bringing suit under Article III’s admiralty or federal question jurisdiction
because the Constitution does not tie these to the identity of the parties.
Citizenship seemed to have less relevance to possession of rights
than mere legal personhood. Article III, section 2, clause 3 provides a
right to a jury in the “Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment,” without reference to citizenship.76 Article I, section 9
prohibits bills of attainder and ex post facto laws without any reference
to the citizenship of the defendant.77 Some provisions of the Bill of
Rights refer to “the people,” which by Taney’s reasoning might not have
included blacks.78 But the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, governing due
process, property confiscation, and criminal procedure, are not so
limited, nor is the right to jury trial in civil cases of the Seventh
Amendment.

71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
74. Article III provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to . . . Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of
another State; —between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subject.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
75. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV states that the “Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 1.
76. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
78. For instance, the Fourth Amendment provides that the “right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Citizenship, Sovereignty, and Secession

More vexing before the Civil War than the legal dimension of U.S.
citizenship was its significance in terms of political obligation. Was
Robert E. Lee an American citizen who owed allegiance to the United
States first and foremost? If so, he was guilty of treason in taking up
arms against the U.S. government and giving aid and comfort to its
enemies.79 Or was he a citizen of Virginia first and foremost, in which
case he was bravely defending his country (Virginia) against a foreign
enemy?
These citizenship issues had an obvious link with visions of the
Union. The constitutionality of secession turned on whether the United
States was a confederation of states (so that being an American citizen
derived from being a state citizen), or whether the United States was a
genuine nation (so that American citizenship was primary). Even today,
these viewpoints have left remnants in historical terminology. The
former view is implicit in references to the Civil War as “the war
between the states,” whereas under the latter view it was a Civil War
between the United States and Southern rebels.
Before the Civil War, the answer to this question was debatable, but
the Constitution itself was more nationalist than many people then or
now seem to realize. To begin with, there is the Preamble’s intention to
create “a more perfect Union”80 than the Articles of Confederation,
which itself was supposed to be perpetual.81 Other provisions of the
Constitution, however, also speak volumes about the desire to create a
powerful national government, not just an agent for a confederation of
independent sovereigns. Besides granting the federal government broad
powers over the economy including control of all interstate commerce,
79. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 provides that “[t]reason against the United States, shall
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
Comfort.”
80. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
81. As the Supreme Court said in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1968):
The Union of the States never was a purely artificial and arbitrary relation. It began
among the Colonies, and grew out of common origin, mutual sympathies, kindred
principles, similar interests, and geographical relations. It was confirmed and
strengthened by the necessities of war, and received definite form, and character, and
sanction from the Articles of Confederation. By these the Union was solemnly declared
to “be perpetual.” And when these Articles were found to be inadequate to the
exigencies of the country, the Constitution was ordained “to form a more perfect Union.”
It is difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these words.
What can be indissoluble if a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is not?
Id. at 724-25. In dissent, Justice Grier refused to opine on the constitutionality of secession and said
that the issue had been settled through “trial by battle.” Id. at 740.
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exclusive power to coin money, and the bankruptcy power,82 the
Constitution invested the powers of war and peace, and the power to
make treaties, in the United States. It explicitly denied those powers to
the states.83 It also allowed the federal government to intervene in the
internal political affairs of a state if it considers the state’s form of
government not to be “Republican” in nature.84
In addition, federal laws are “the Supreme Law of the Land” and
override state constitutions, meaning that the people of the states gave up
their plenary power to draft constitutions to suit themselves.85 The
federal government also controls naturalization and hence limits the
power of a state to determine who counts as a citizen. All of these
provisions seem well beyond the terms of a mere confederation. The
states did retain control of purely local affairs, but that role seems
decidedly subordinate to the sweeping constitutional powers of the
federal government to address issues of national and international
importance.
To see the degree to which the Constitution created something
more than a mere confederation, it may be helpful to consider a modernday analogy. Imagine a proposal to give “the United States of All the
Americas (USAA)” the power to replace the U.S. dollar with a new
currency, while disbanding the U.S. Army in favor of a military
controlled by a president elected by North and South Americans. The
USAA also controls all international trade in the Americas and takes
over control of immigration issues. On top of this, the laws of the
USAA override the U.S. Constitution. It is hard to imagine that anyone
would think this organization was just a federation of existing states like
NATO or that the USAA was merely acting as an agent for individual
governments like the IMF or World Bank today.
Even more than the extensive national powers given to the U.S.
government, the title of the document speaks strongly of nationhood. Its
predecessor was called the Articles of Confederation. Eschewing this
term, the new title is “Constitution of the United States.” According to
the Preamble, this national constitution is “ordain[ed] and establish[ed] .
. . for the United States of America” by “We the People of the United

82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (commerce power); cl. 4 (bankruptcy); cl. 5 (control of the
money supply). Other economic powers include control of intellectual property rights, art. I, § 8,
cl. 8; the taxing and spending powers, cl. 1; and control of weights and measures, cl. 5.
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, 3.
84. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
85. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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States” in order “to form a more perfect Union.”86 This language sounds
very much like the creation of a nation—as the union of Scotland and
England created the United Kingdom.87
Notably, the Constitutional Convention sent the Continental
Congress a letter explaining its efforts.88 The letter spoke of the need to
place key powers “fully and effectually” in the federal government,
which admittedly would require some sacrifice of state sovereignty.89
Moreover, the letter says: “In all our deliberations on this subject we
kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of
every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is
involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national
existence.”90 The references to “consolidation” and to “our national
existence” are inconsistent with the notion of a confederation. The letter
closes with the hope that the Constitution “may promote the lasting
welfare of that country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom and
happiness”—rather than the “welfare of the countries dear to each of
us.”91 This is nationalist language, not the language of a compact
between independent sovereigns.
Still, the case of American nationhood (and with it, the case against
secession) cannot be considered ironclad before the Civil War. As
Madison pointed out in Federalist 39, the structure of the government
contained ambiguities.92 Madison pointed to nationalist features of the
Constitution such as the operation and extent of federal powers.93 Yet
the governance structure relied heavily on the states as separate entities
(such as the election of Senators by state legislatures), and the
ratification process was by state conventions rather than a national vote.

86. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
87. On the resemblance between the formation of the U.K. and the Constitution, see Akhil
Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 683 (2002) (“The phrase ‘perfect Union’ in fact echoes
language from the Union of England and Scotland in 1707, as Publius reminds his readers in The
Federalist No. 5”).
88. The text of the letter can be found in Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution’s Forgotten
Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV.
615, 649-50 (1995).
89. Id. at 649.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 650.
92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 239 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888).
93. Id.
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III. CITIZENSHIP, RECONSTRUCTION, AND PROTECTION AGAINST STATE
ACTION
In short, although the Constitution bears strong marks of nation
building, there was no smoking-gun proof of the nature of the Union in
the constitutional text that could decisively prevent Southerners from
adopting a states-rights vision. As Part III will explain, that smoking
gun was supplied by the Fourteenth Amendment. What was arguably
still an open question in 1860 was answered in no uncertain terms in
1866 with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The relevant portions of the Fourteenth Amendment are familiar
but their significance is obscure today because we have lost the
historical context that made issues of U.S. citizenship so foundational to
the constitutional regime. The first sentence of the amendment provides
that “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.”94 Only with the passage of this amendment did it
become incontestable that state citizenship was merely a geographic byproduct of federal citizenship. Correspondingly, the second sentence of
the amendment prohibits states from interfering with the privileges and
immunities of national citizenship.95 The upshot of these sections is the
United States involves a direct relationship between the federal
government and citizens that is beyond any form of interference by the
states, which enjoy only a secondary right to allegiance from their
residents. While the two clauses may seem to deal only with some
narrowly-defined legal issues relating to citizenship, the implications
were much broader.
Part III discusses the implications of this change for the issue of
secession. The right to secede is a natural feature of a confederation
where citizens owe allegiance to their own individual local governments,
but out of place in a nation that demands the primary allegiance of its
citizens and in turn promises to protect their rights from interference by
local governments.
We will begin in Part A by examining the reciprocal relationship
between a citizen’s allegiance to the sovereign and the right to protection
by the sovereign. Part B shows how these ideas entered the
Reconstruction view of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Then, Part C shows how concepts of allegiance and protection were put
to use in the Reconstruction debates to support the right of American
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
95. Id.
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citizens to national protection against infringement by their own state
governments. Finally, Part D shows how the Supreme Court viewed the
relationship between citizenship and rights after the Civil War.
Although the Court took a narrow view of what rights inhered in
national citizenship, it clearly understood that national citizenship was
primary and beyond the reach of state authority.
A.

Protection and Allegiance

According to legal historian Philip Hamburger, “[t]he reciprocal
relation of allegiance and protection . . . became a foundation of
American government.”96 As we will see, this concept was deeply
embedded in the common law and in the thinking of the Republicans
who passed the Fourteenth Amendment. It implied that, if residents of
seceding states remained U.S. citizens, they were entitled to the
protection of the U.S. government against would-be secessionists and to
enforcement of their rights under federal law.
The connections between citizenship, allegiance, and government
protection went back in English law at least to the time of Lord Coke,
who was faced with such issues in the context of determining the rights
of citizens of Scotland under English law during the reign of James I.97
James had become King of both England and Scotland, but the countries
had separate parliaments, so it was not clear how their citizenships
related.98 Fundamental to Coke’s analysis was the proposition that the
“bond between the subject and the sovereign . . . involved reciprocal
obligations” of allegiance and protection that attached at birth.99 The
duty of allegiance to the King and the correlative rights to “the King’s
legal protection” were explicit in the case.100 Because Scots born after
the Union received the protection of James, who was monarch of both
Scotland and England, they acquired a duty of allegiance to both states
and hence citizenship in both parts of the realm.
In the American Civil War, both sides claimed entitlement to
allegiance, in each case implying that violations of allegiance would
constitute treason. Based on the theory that individual allegiance flowed

96. Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1853 (2009).
97. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 16-17.
98. Id. at 16.
99. Id. at 18.
100. See Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 88-89 (1997). Francis Bacon’s argument for the plaintiff insisted that
allegiance was due under the law of nature. Id. at 109-10. Coke accepted this theory. Id. at 113,
115.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 6

12- FARBER_MACRO.DOCM

500

6/13/2012 3:42 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[45:479

fundamentally to the states, the Confederacy maintained that no change
in allegiance took place at secession. Thus, unlike the American
Revolution, where individuals were considered to have a period in which
to choose allegiance, the allegiance of Southerners automatically
remained with the existing states when those state governments chose to
sever their relationship with the federal government.101 Hence, after
secession, Southern Unionists were subject to the law of treason. A
similar situation would arise today if the United States decided to leave
the United Nations or NATO. Such a decision would clearly have no
effect on the status of U.S. citizens who would remain citizens of the
United States, not citizens of NATO, and Americans who chose to side
with NATO against the United States in a military conflict would be
guilty of treason. For the same reason, according to Confederate legal
theory, Southerners who decided to side with the North after secession
were guilty of treason.102
As might be expected, Northerners took a different view. The
significance attached to national citizenship and allegiance in the North
became evident in the early days of the war. In the Prize Cases,103 for
example, the Supreme Court was required to determine not only the
president’s power to impose a blockade, but also the relationship of
Southerners to the federal government after the outbreak of the war.104
The Court strongly affirmed presidential power to react to the
emergency without waiting for congressional approval or a declaration
of war. When war broke out, the Court said, “[t]he President was bound
to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to
baptize it with a name; and no name given to it by him or them could
change the fact.”105 As to the question of the status of the citizens in the
South, the Court said, “[t]hey have cast off their allegiance and made
war on their Government, and are none the less enemies because they

101. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 335.
102. Id.
103. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
104. Id. at 640-41. In attempting to uphold the blockade, the federal government was put in a
difficult position. On the one hand, it was committed to the position that secession was legally void
and that Southerners remained citizens of the United States subject to American municipal law. The
implication of this view was that the Civil War was in effect a police action against a band of
criminals. But such a police action would not give the United States the right under the law of
nations to impose a blockade on neutrals on the high seas, nor would it give the Government the
right under the Constitution to seize the property of citizens who were not proved to be members of
the criminal group. Those remedies were available only against enemy aliens. Republicans
uneasily straddled these conflicting theories.
105. Id. at 669.
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are traitors.”106 In an affirmation of nationalism, the Court also said that
citizens owe “supreme allegiance” to the federal government but only
“qualified allegiance” to their states.107 Note that this holding anticipates
the view ultimately enshrined in the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
B.

Citizenship and Rights

Given the emotional significance of allegiance during the sectional
conflict and the expansion of national power under the stress of war, it is
not remarkable that Republicans used the concept of national citizenship
to justify their support for the Civil Rights bill. Republicans invoked the
Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV, Section 2, of the original
Constitution. As we will see, they believed that the clause had already
established the connection between United States citizenship and
fundamental rights.
Congressional Republicans had their own theory of citizenship,
based in part on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.
Section 2 of Article IV provides that “[t]he citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States.”108 This language is somewhat unclear. One reading is that “in
the several states” tells us both where the rights are protected and which
rights exist (those created severally—that is separately—in particular
states). On this reading, the clause prohibits states from discriminating
against citizens of other states. But the other reading is that the
“privileges and immunities of citizens” are national in scope rather than
being defined by particular state. Every law student today learns the
antidiscrimination meaning of the clause, which may well be the correct
interpretation. But Republicans, as we will see, often favored the
national rights interpretation.
The Republican interpretation of this clause relied heavily on
Corfield v. Coryell.109 In Corfield, Justice Bushrod Washington said that

106. Id. at 674.
107. “Under the very peculiar Constitution of this Government, although the citizens owe
supreme allegiance to the Federal Government, they owe also a qualified allegiance to the State in
which they are domiciled.” Id. at 673.
108. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
109. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). See also Douglas v.
Stephens, 1 Del. Ch. 465, 469-74, 476-77 (1821). Corfield has some resemblance to the Supreme
Court’s current view of the Comity Clause, which also uses a fundamental rights analysis, although
the modern Court uses the idea of fundamental rights as a limitation on the anti-discrimination
prohibition rather than viewing it as the core of the clause’s meaning. For a critique of Corfield and
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the Comity Clause protected “those privileges and immunities which are,
in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the
citizens of the several states.”110 Among these rights were “[p]rotection
by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.”111
This interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause figured
prominently in the debates on the 1866 Civil Rights bill. One purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment was to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act,
so the debates on that statute are particularly relevant to understanding
the amendment.
In the Senate debate on the 1866 act, Senator Lyman Trumbull
referred to the Privileges and Immunities Clause to support the
constitutionality of federal civil rights legislation at a time when the
Fourteenth Amendment did not yet exist. He argued that:
The rights of a citizen of the United States were certain great
fundamental rights, such as the right to life, to liberty, and to avail
one’s self of all the laws passed for the benefit of the citizen to enable
him to enforce his rights; inasmuch as this was the definition given to
the term as applied in that part of the Constitution, I reasoned from
that, that when the Constitution had been amended and slavery
abolished, and we were about to pass a law declaring every person, no
matter of what color, born in the United States a citizen of the United
States, the same rights would then appertain to all persons who were
clothed with American citizenship.112

In the House, Representative Henry Wilson argued that the rights
protected in the bill were not new because they were already contained
in the Comity Clause as construed in Corfield. In his view, that clause
represented a “general citizenship” which “entitles every citizen to

its use as a limitation on the clause, see Stewart Jay, Origins of the Privileges and Immunities of
State Citizenship under Article IV, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=185377.
110. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
111. Id. For a more in-depth discussion of the case, see David R. Upham, Note, Corfield v.
Coryell and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1483 (2005).
112. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 600 (1866). See also id. at 476 (bill protects
“fundamental rights belonging to every man as a free man”). Trumbull used somewhat similar
language in connection with the Freedmen’s Bureau bill. See id. at 319, 322.
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security and protection of personal rights.”113 He argued that the bill
protected rights belonging to “citizens of the United States, as such.”114
Representative Lawrence discussed the role of the Comity Clause
in great detail in his response to the President’s veto of the bill. He
stated:
I maintain that Congress may by law secure the citizens of the nation
in the enjoyment of their inherent right of life, liberty, and property,
and the means essential to that end, . . . to enforce the observance of
the provisions of [the Comity Clause], and the equal civil rights which
it recognizes or by implication affirms to exist among citizens of the
same State.115

Lawrence concluded, after a discussion of some of the cases and
writings dealing with the Comity Clause, that it embodies “equal
fundamental civil rights for all citizens.”116
Thus, even before the Fourteenth Amendment, members of the
Reconstruction saw Congress as having the power to protect the rights of
citizens from violation by state government.
They rooted this
understanding in a clause protecting the “privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states.” When it came time to ensure that their
constitutional views were entrenched in the constitutional text, they
chose similar but more explicit language relating to the “privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.”
C.

Protecting the Rights of Citizens Against the States

Another concept played an important role in the debates over the
Civil Rights Act: the idea that citizens owe allegiance to their
government in exchange for the government’s grant of protection to
them. Thus, one of the most important rights of citizenship is the right
to receive such protection. This concept served not only as a possible
source of rights, but also as a source of power to protect the rights of
citizens that might arise from other sources such as the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.

113. Id. at 1118.
114. Id. at 1294.
115. Id. at 1835.
116. Id. at 1836. See also id. at 1263 (remarks by Rep. Broomall listing free speech as one of
the “rights and immunities of citizens”); id. at 1266 (remarks of Rep. Raymond listing “right to bear
arms” as a right of citizens); id. at 1293-94 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger, right of petition is an
“indispensable” right of citizenship).
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Early in the debates on the Civil Rights Act, Senator Reverdy
Johnson raised the argument that the federal government had a duty to
protect its citizens from state interference with their rights:
If I am right . . . that we can authorize them [blacks] to sue, authorize
them to contract, authorize them to do everything short of voting, it is
not because there is anything in the Constitution of the United States
that confers the authority to give to a negro the right to contract, but it
is because it is a necessary, incidental function of a Government that it
should have authority to provide that the rights of everybody within its
limits shall be protected, and protected alike.117

Senator Johnson concluded that it “would have been a disgrace to the
members of the [Constitutional] Convention” if they had foreseen the
abolition of slavery and “had denied to the Congress of the United States
the authority to pass laws for the protection of all the rights incident to
the condition of a free man.”118 His argument was echoed by Senator
Morrill.119
A similar argument was made in the House by Representative
Broomall. He made a sweeping, non-textual argument:
But throwing aside the letter of the Constitution, there are
characteristics of Governments that belong to them as such, without
which they would cease to be Governments. The rights and duties of
allegiance and protection are corresponding rights and duties. . . .
[Wherever] I owe allegiance to my country, there it owes me
protection, and wherever my Government owes me no protection I owe
it no allegiance and can commit no treason.120

Broomall attacked the idea that such protection could be left to the
states, inasmuch as “everybody knows that the rights and immunities of
citizens were habitually and systematically denied in certain States to the
citizens of other States: the right of speech, the right of transit, the right
of domicil [sic], the right to sue, the writ of habeas corpus, and the right
of petition.”121 Broomall also argued that the necessity for the bill was
not limited to blacks because loyal whites were being denied their basic
rights in the South.122

117. Id. at 530. See also Johnson’s expostulation in response to a contrary argument by Sen.
Henderson. Id. at 572.
118. Id. at 530.
119. Id. at 570 (remarks of Sen. Morrill).
120. Id. at 1263.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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Representative Wilson made one of the most forceful arguments
based on the duty to protect. He argued that the bill did not establish
new rights, but instead protected and enforced those which already
belonged to every citizen. In his opinion, the Comity Clause entitled
every citizen to protection of personal rights. He summarized his
defense of congressional power as follows:
If a citizen of the United States should go abroad, and while within the
jurisdiction of a foreign Power be despoiled of his rights of personal
security, personal liberty, or personal property contrary to the due
course of law of the nation inflicting the wrong, this Government
would espouse his cause and enforce redress even to the extremity of
war.123

From the power to protect U.S. citizens from foreign powers by war,
Wilson deduced as a lesser-included case the power to protect citizens
from their own state governments by peaceful means:
[I]f all the terrible powers of war may be resorted to for the protection
of the rights of our citizens when those rights are disregarded and
trampled on beyond our jurisdiction, is it possible that our Constitution
is so defective that we have no power under it to protect our citizens
within our own jurisdiction through the peaceful means of statutes and
courts?124

Thus, Wilson concluded, the federal government had the inherent power
to prevent states from violating the rights of U.S. citizens:
I assert that we possess the power to do those things which
Governments are organized to do; that we may protect a citizen of the
United States against a violation of his rights by the law of a single
State; . . . that this power permeates our whole system, is a part of it,
without which the States can run riot over every fundamental right
belonging to citizens of the United States; that the right to exercise this
power depends upon no express delegation, but runs with the rights it
is designed to protect.125

Likewise, Representative Shellabarger stressed that because
citizens owe their primary allegiance to the federal government, the
government’s primary duty correspondingly was to protect them. Like
Wilson, Shellabarger argued that if the states could abridge those rights
which the United States is bound to protect, even by a declaration of war
123. Id. at 1119. Wilson reiterated essentially the same argument. Id. at App. 157, 1294.
124. Id. at 1119.
125. Id. A similar view was articulated by Representative Shellabarger. Id. at 1293.
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in the case of violations by foreign governments, then “the United States
is no nation.”126
After President Andrew Johnson’s veto of the Civil Rights Bill,
Senator Trumbull made an important speech in the Senate defending the
bill against Johnson’s charges. He asserted:
To be a citizen of the United States carries with it some rights; . . .
They are those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free
citizens or free men in all countries, such as the rights enumerated in
this bill, and they belong to them in all the States of the Union.127

In short, he said, “the right of American citizenship means
something.”128 That is a truism today, but would have been contested by
Southerners before the war, who viewed American citizenship as
nothing but a proxy for citizenship in Virginia or some other state.
Trumbull stated that citizens are entitled to protection within the
states as well as abroad. He asserted that “American citizenship would
be little worth” if it did not carry protection with it:
How is it that every person born in these United States owes
allegiance to the Government? Everything that he is or has, his
property and his life, may be taken by the Government of the United
States in its defense . . . and can it be that . . . we have got a
Government which is all-powerful to command the obedience of the
citizen, but has no power to afford him protection? Is that all that this
boasted American citizenship amounts to? . . . Sir, it cannot be.129

Trumbull staunchly rejected this limited view of the nature of
citizenship:
Such is not the meaning of our Constitution. Such is not the meaning
of American citizenship. This Government, which would go to war to
protect its meanest—I will not say citizen—inhabitant . . . in any
foreign land whose rights were unjustly encroached upon, has certainly
some power to protect its own citizens in their own country.
Allegiance and protection are reciprocal rights.130

The right to protection was embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment, which prohibited states from interfering with the rights of
citizens or any inhabitant to due process and equal protection. Yet

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id. at 1757.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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secession truncates the rights of national citizenship for any citizens who
remain in the state. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, states do not
have the power to impair these rights of national citizenship, and section
5 of the Amendment explicitly gives Congress the power to take any
necessary action to deal with the situation.131
D.

Citizenship and the Slaughterhouse Cases

When it came time for the Supreme Court to interpret the
Reconstruction Amendments, the significance of national citizenship
was not overlooked. The appellants in the Slaughterhouse Cases argued
that:
The doctrine of the “States-Rights party,” led in modern times by Mr.
Calhoun, was, that there was no citizenship in the whole United States,
except sub modo and by the permission of the States. According to
their theory the United States had no integral existence except as an
incomplete combination among several integers. The fourteenth
amendment struck at, and forever destroyed, all such doctrines. . . . By
it the national principle has received an indefinite enlargement. The tie
between the United States and every citizen in every part of its own
jurisdiction has been made intimate and familiar.132

This argument reflected a clear understanding of how the Fourteenth
Amendment solidified the bond between citizens and the national
government.
Similarly, in his dissent, Justice Stephen Field also clearly
articulated the import of the amendment for national citizenship and its
accompanying rights. He began by demonstrating his awareness of the
past confusion on this topic:
The first clause of this amendment determines who are citizens of
the United States, and how their citizenship is created. Before its
enactment there was much diversity of opinion among jurists and
statesmen whether there was any such citizenship independent of that
of the State, and, if any existed, as to the manner in which it originated.
With a great number the opinion prevailed that there was no such
citizenship independent of the citizenship of the State. Such was the
opinion of Mr. Calhoun and the class represented by him.133

131. Section 5 provides that “[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
132. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1872).
133. Id. at 94.
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After recounting the holding in Dred Scott, Field explained how the
Fourteenth Amendment settled the question of who possessed
citizenship as well as of the significance of citizenship as a source of
rights:
The first clause of the fourteenth amendment changes this whole
subject, and removes it from the region of discussion and doubt. . . . A
citizen of a State is now only a citizen of the United States residing in
that State. The fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which
belong to him as a free man and a free citizen, now belong to him as a
citizen of the United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship
of any State.134

Of course, the views of the advocates and the dissent are less
significant than the view of the majority. While the majority opinion
rejects the sweeping vision of national rights advocated by Fields and
respondent’s attorneys, it reflects a clear understanding of the primacy of
national citizenship and of the fact that this citizenship carries with it
genuine rights.135
Like the dissent, the majority opinion displays an awareness of the
pre-War confusion regarding citizenship.
Justice Samuel Miller
recounted the antebellum disputes about citizenship. First, he said, there
was confusion over the status of individuals born within the United
States but not in any state:
It had been said by eminent judges that no man was a citizen of the
United States, except as he was a citizen of one of the States
composing the Union. Those, therefore, who had been born and
resided always in the District of Columbia or in the Territories, though

134. Id. at 95.
135. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1868), also tangentially touches upon citizenship. In the first
half of the decision, the Court held that Texas never seceded from the United States: “The
Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible
States.” Id. at 725. In considering whether the actions of Texas rebel legislature were valid, the
Court held that citizens’ individual obligations to the Constitution were pre-eminent over their
obligations to their state:
Obligations often remain unimpaired, while relations are greatly changed. The
obligations of allegiance to the State, and of obedience to her laws, subject to the
Constitution of the United States, are binding upon all citizens, whether faithful or
unfaithful to them; but the relations which subsist while these obligations are performed,
are essentially different from those which arise when they are disregarded and set at
nought. And the same must necessarily be true of the obligations and relations of States
and citizens to the Union. . . . The government and the citizens of the State, refusing to
recognize their constitution obligations, assumed the character of enemies, and incurred
the consequences of rebellion.
Id. at 727.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss2/6

30

Farber: The Fourteenth Amendment

12- FARBER_MACRO.DOCM

2012]

6/13/2012 3:42 PM

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

509

within the United States, were not citizens. Whether this proposition
was sound or not had never been judicially decided.136

More significant, however, was the issue of black citizenship. Dred
Scott was not forgotten:
But it had been held by this court, in the celebrated Dred Scott case,
only a few years before the outbreak of the civil war, that a man of
African descent, whether a slave or not, was not and could not be a
citizen of a State or of the United States. This decision . . . had never
been overruled; and if it was to be accepted as a constitutional
limitation of the right of citizenship, then all the negro race who had
recently been made freemen, were still, not only not citizens, but were
incapable of becoming so by anything short of an amendment to the
Constitution.137

Justice Miller explained how the Citizenship Clause resolved these
issues:
The first observation we have to make on this clause is, that it puts at
rest both the questions which we stated to have been the subject of
differences of opinion. It declares that persons may be citizens of the
United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State,
and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born
within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the
United States.138

Miller then listed some privileges and immunities of national citizenship
that are protected against state interference. The rights on his list are, at
least today, quite uncontroversial, but we should keep in mind that a
state’s secession would have deprived each of its citizens of every right
on the list except to the extent that some later treaty might allow
foreigners from the seceded state to exercise these rights. Justice
Miller’s list included the following:
• “[T]he right of the citizen of this great country, protected
by implied guarantees of its Constitution, ‘to come to the
seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon
that government, to transact any business he may have with
it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in
administering its functions. He has the right of free access
to its seaports, through which all operations of foreign

136. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72-73.
137. Id. at 73.
138. Id.
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commerce are conducted, to the subtreasuries, land offices,
and courts of justice in the several States.’”139
• “Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to
demand the care and protection of the Federal government
over his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or
within the jurisdiction of a foreign government.”140
• “The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are
rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution.”141
• “The right to use the navigable waters of the United States,
however they may penetrate the territory of the several
States, all rights secured to our citizens by treaties with
foreign nations, are dependent upon citizenship of the
United States, and not citizenship of a State.”142
• “[A] citizen of the United States can, of his own volition,
become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bonâ fide
residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of
that State.143
• “To these may be added the rights secured by the thirteenth
and fifteenth articles of amendment, and by the other
clauses of the fourteenth.”144
Most of these rights relate to American nationhood—the citizen’s
connection with the federal government and the right to recognition of
national citizenship by every state. Secession would obviously interfere
with these rights—for instance, no longer would citizens of another state
retain the right to enter and become citizens of the seceded state or to use
the navigable waters in that state, nor would the citizens of the seceded
state retain their rights as American citizens. The Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes it clear that no
state has the power to deprive U.S. citizens within its borders of these
rights.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 79.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 80.
Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
School children today pledge allegiance “to the flag of the United
States of America, and to the republic for which it stands, one nation,
under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” Much of
constitutional import is captured by this pledge: that allegiance is to the
United States as “one nation,” not a confederation; that the nation is
“indivisible,” not subject to being divided by secession; and that all of
this is tied with a national guarantee of “justice for all,” which is to say
protection of the rights of individuals.
Before the Civil War and the Fourteenth Amendment, none of this
could have been said with complete assurance. Southerners, and a
significant number of Northerners, would have thought it more correct
for the pledge to refer to the flag and “to the republics for which it
stands, one Confederation, divisible at the will of any state, with liberty
and justice for all white men.”
This hypothetical pledge would have encapsulated the Southern
constitutional vision for the benefit of school children. Prior to the Civil
War, the state governments were primarily responsible for meeting the
basic needs of American citizens. The national government had little
impact on the daily lives of most Americans. Consequently, before the
war, state citizenship was usually paramount in practical importance,
and arguably of paramount legal importance as well. From this premise,
it was a small step to the conclusion that allegiance to the state came
before allegiance to the federal government, as Southerners like Robert
E. Lee reluctantly decided. But such concepts obviously could not
survive the Civil War, a war fought in large part over the primary
allegiance of the citizen. The decision to defeat secession by force
necessarily implied that the citizen’s relationship to the national
government took precedence over his or her relationship to the state.
How far we have come from the antebellum Southern view of the
Union was illustrated recently during former Governor Sarah Palin’s bus
tour. Although Palin is no friend of federal power,145 her bus touts the
indivisibility of the American Republic: “You’ll never guess the colors
of the Palin bus. In huge letters it has the closing Pledge of Allegiance
line: ‘One nation, under God, indivisible with liberty and justice for all.’
Plus an image of the Declaration of Independence with the words ‘We

145. See, e.g., Robert Faturechi, Palin takes jabs, makes no promises, L.A. TIMES, May 2,
2011, at AA2 (Palin delivers “searing critique of big government”).
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the people.’”146 “Indivisible,” of course, means that the nation cannot be
divided through secession.
Given the Fourteenth Amendment, it is clear that today’s pledge is
correct: we owe our primary allegiance to the United States, which is a
nation rather than a confederation, and which in return offers us
protection for our rights as citizens. Correspondingly, states, as building
blocks of the nation, have only second place in our allegiance with state
citizenship being defined by the Fourteenth Amendment as only a
geographic marker depending on where an American citizen happens to
reside at any given time.
Today, then, there would be no doubt about the choice facing a
modern-day Robert E. Lee. He could live up to his obligations as a
citizen of the “indivisible” United States.
Or, by joining an
unconstitutional armed rebellion, he could attempt to assist a state in
destroying the privileges and immunities of national citizenship for its
own residents. In using force on behalf of this effort, he would have to
make war against the United States and give aid and comfort to the
enemy. For him to claim that his primary allegiance was to his home
state rather than the national government would be to profoundly
mistake the nature of the post-Civil War constitutional order. In Lee’s
time, perhaps there was some basis for good faith confusion on this
point, but after the Civil War and the Fourteenth Amendment, there can
be no question about the unconstitutionality of secession.

146. Andrew Malcolm, Sarah Palin and her ‘One Nation’ bus tour, coming to a town near
voters soon, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2011, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2011/05/sarahpalin-bus-tour-memorial-day-.html.
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